Yet, the available evidence suggests a more nuanced picture. Strikingly, analysis of large-scale surveys such as the European Social Survey (ESS) (Röder and Mühlau 2012) , the Crime Survey of England and Wales (Bradford et al. 2016) , and World Values Survey (Nannestad et al. 2014) suggests that, at least in some contexts, immigrants' views of the police can actually be more positive on average than those of their native-born counterparts. One possible explanation focuses on the change in 'institutional frames' that immigrants experience as they move from origin to destination countries. In a paper that foreshadowed the current contribution, Röder and Mühlau (2012) found that across 21 European countries, immigrants who had moved from high to low corruption countries had higher levels of trust in the police than the native-born (see also Röder and Mühlau 2011) : immigrants may judge the trustworthiness of the police in the destination country partly on the basis of the (un)trustworthiness of the police in the origin country. This paper advances the literature in three ways. First, we draw upon data from Round 5 of the ESS, which contained an unusually rich collection of measures relating to police-public relations. The dataset used in this paper covers 27 countries, has a sample size of 52,458, and contains 4,962 first-generation immigrants hailing from a total of 166 countries. Second, we assess the relevance of institutional frames alongside important contextual factors. We include in our models a set of criminologically relevant variables as potential predictors of legitimacysuch as victimization and contact with the police -alongside measures of social and economic position and change in contexts association with migration. Third, while Röder and Muhlau (2012) addressed trust in the police, we consider legitimacy, a facet of public opinion often treated as a more proximate explanation for why people comply with the law and cooperate with the police -precisely the kinds of normative behaviour some argue that immigration undermines. Our overall goal is, then, to assess the extent to which a diverse range of factors explain variation in the legitimacy judgements of immigrants -and indeed non-immigrants -living in European countries. To anticipate our results, we find that change in institutional frames does seem to influence immigrant's views of police. Broadly speaking, people who move from poorer countries with less effective justice systems to richer countries with more effective justice systems tend to grant more legitimacy to the police in the destination country. Yet, like others, views of police among immigrant populations are influenced by personal contact with officers and position within vertical and horizontal structure of social ordering.
What shapes police legitimacy among immigrants?
Global flows of migration are complex (Abel and Sander 2014), but wherever they have moved from or too, and whatever push and pull forces are driving movement, a wide range of factors are likely to shape the legitimacy of the police among immigrant populations. These may include experiences of police (in destination and origin countries), the social and cultural characteristics of origin and destination countries, the strength of (and change in) affiliation with local, national and trans-national identities, and ideological stances toward institutions of order maintenance developed on one part of the world yet applied in another. In this paper we concentrate on three sets of variables that relate to people's experiences of both policing and of being immigrants (or non-immigrants) in the county in which they reside: personal experience of police activity in the destination country; group position; and expectations or beliefs influenced by the change of institutional context associated with the act of immigration. A strand linking all three potentially important predictors of legitimacy is the idea that police represent dominant social categories, and indeed the state itself, a point we return to at several points in the discussion below.
Contact with police
Personal contact with officers is one of the most reliable predictors of opinions about the police.
Cross-sectional (e.g. Van Damme et al. 2015) , longitudinal (e.g. Tyler and Fagan 2008) and experimental studies (e.g. Mazerolle et al. 2013 ) have consistently identified strong associations between recent contact with police and measures of trust, legitimacy, propensity for future cooperation, and related constructs. The nature of this association is often 'asymmetrical' (Skogan 2006) , with contacts with officers judged to be unsatisfactory seemingly having a large negative effect on people's views of police, whereas those judged to be satisfactory tend to have a smaller (often much smaller) positive effect.
Research into what makes an encounter with a police officer satisfactory or unsatisfactory has revealed almost equally consistent findings. Across a wide range of research settings, the assessment of the procedural fairness of police behaviour has been found to be the central predictor not only of satisfaction with the specific encounter but also wider views of police (Mazerolle et al. 2014 ). This finding, and its putative causes, is particularly pertinent in the present context. One reason why police fairness seems to be so important to the policed is that officers represent important social categories and identities within particular contexts.
Through the way they treat people, police communicate powerful messages concerning inclusion, status and value within superordinate social categories, which have been characterized as associated with nation, state and citizenship (e.g. Loader and Mulcahy 2003) .
People tend to be sensitive to officer behavior and react particularly negatively to perceived unfairness, in part because police activity is identity relevant to them -it can serve to weaken, damage or even negate their sense of self and their idea of where they 'fit' in society (Parmar 2011; Justice and Meares 2014) . Officer activity can also bolster, or undermine, the claim police make to speak for and represent the policed (Stott et al. 2011) . Policing perceived as unfair can create a sense that the values of police and those of the policed are in conflict; this, in turn, can serve to convince the latter that the police cannot claim to represent 'people like them'. These processes form an important 'bridge' linking contact experiences with legitimacy: people are intensely attuned to the quality of officer behavior, making it salient in their wider judgements of police. And there is much to suggest that immigrant populations will have high levels of police contact, whether because police attention is concentrated on members of minority groups, a well-established phenomenon across multiple contexts (e.g. Adjami 2006; Goris et al. 2009; Tóth and Kádar 2012) , or as a result of the increasingly blurred lines between immigration control, law and policing ('crimmigration' -Stumpf 2006; Weber 2011; Bowling and Marks 2015) . Empirical evidence concerning levels of police contact among immigrants compared with non-immigrants is mixed, however, with some studies reporting that immigrants are indeed more likely to have contact with police (Provine and Sanchez 2011; Añón et al. 2013 ; Theodore and Habans 2016) but others finding little or no association, or even that immigrants are less likely to have police contact (Davis and Hendricks 2007; Correia 2010) . Weitzer (2010) argues that police-minority relationships are influenced not only by contacts between minority group members and police but also by the extent to which the former are incorporated into the wider society (see also Weitzer and Tuch 2006) . This would seem to apply equally to immigrant groups. The manner and extent to which a particular group is incorporated -or 'socially included' -will likely have an important implications for members' relations with police, not least because the police represent the dominant order and reflect back to people their status and value within it. Indeed, an individual's relationship with police, as a specific state institution, seems likely to be imbricated with their relationship with the state in general. The legitimacy granted to one will reflect and refract the legitimacy granted to the other.
Group position
Drawing on Bobo's theory of group position (1999), Weitzer and Tuch (2006) extend this argument to include the objective characteristics of social groups and their location within cultural, political and economic hierarchies: group position will influence how group members conceive of institutions of social and political ordering. People will feel an affinity with those that serve their interests; members of groups that 'do well' out of current arrangements will tend to support the agencies tasked with maintaining them. By contrast members of socially excluded or marginalized groups will have less positive views of such institutions: the legitimacy of the police may suffer when people feel that the system 'doesn't work for them' and may even be working against them. Moreover, the marginalization or exclusion of particular groups may trigger, for a variety of reasons, aggressive styles of policing that seek to control the tensions thus created -via higher levels of stop and search/frisk, for example -providing a link with the experiential factors outlined above. A key claim of this model is that once group position is taken into account, pairwise correlations between minority -or immigrant -status and views of the police should attenuate or even disappear. (Oliveira and Murphy 2014) . Members of groups that are associated more strongly with dominant social categories seem likely, all else equal, to grant police more legitimacy; not necessarily because they gain in an instrumental sense from their position within society, but because they feel they belong to, and are included in, the wider social group police represent.
Institutional frames
The final set of factors that may explain the legitimacy judgments of immigrants (versus nativeborn and in comparison with immigrants from different countries) is the change in institutional frames -or 'frames of reference' (Röder and Mühlau 2012) -they experience as a result of the act of migration. When individuals move to a new context they may view the police, and other state institutions, through a lens developed in their country of origin. Alternatively, the extent to which they grant legitimacy to institutions in the destination country may be predicted by the quality of those institutions in comparison to equivalent institutions in their country of origin (Dinesen 2012; Nannestad et al. 2014) . People who move from countries with corrupt, inefficient police services may continue to view police in their destination country as corrupt and inefficient because that is the way they have been socialized to view police (Harris 2006);  or, by contrast, they may compare the police in their new home favourably with those they experienced before. The lens people use to view police may also concern the wider ability of the state to protect and properly serve its citizens. Indeed, because police are not merely part of the state apparatus but also represent it in embodied form, their legitimacy may be particularly likely to be influenced by wider perceptions of state performance and the general condition of society.
This last idea chimes with existing research on the predictors of police legitimacy and public opinions of policing. Perceptions of the general level of corruption in country, for example, have been linked to views of the police (Thomassen 2013) , as has 'system satisfaction' (Thomassen and Kääriänen 2016) and perceptions of government performance (Bradford et al. 2014 ). On a more local or visceral level, research in the US and UK has found that neighbourhood conditions -the extent of low level disorder, the strength of community cohesion -are strong predictors of police legitimacy (Jackson et al. 2013; Nix et al. 2015) as well as wider views of police (Sampson and Bartusch 1998) . On this account, when local order seems well-established and strong the police, representatives of that order, gain public trust and legitimacy (Jackson and Bradford 2009 ). Nor should we forget arguably more instrumental concerns about safety. Successes -and failures -in dealing with problems of crime, and perhaps particularly violent crime, might also influence people's perceptions of police. It seems entirely plausible to suggest that moving from a more violent to a less violent society may well have an effect on one's views of the police.
There is some evidence that the change in institutional frames associated with migration influence views of the police, the weight of which seems to suggest that moving from a 'worse' to a 'better' institutional context is associated with an uplift in opinions. Röder and Mühlau (2012) found that having moved from a more to a less corrupt country was associated, on average, with more favourable views of police, while Bradford et al. (2016) found that immigrants from Africa and South Asia (many of whom will have come from countries with highly corrupt police and political systems) living in England and Wales trusted the police significantly more than non-immigrants. Nannestad et al. (2014) report similar findings, and conclude that better 'quality' institutions in destination countries (in their case, Denmark) is linked to higher levels of trust in those institutions among immigrants from countries with lower quality institutions.
Hypotheses
Drawing together the discussion above we hypothesize that immigrants will on average grant the police more legitimacy than non-immigrants (H1). We also hypothesize that experiences of police (H2) and group position (H3) will also predict police legitimacy, as will any change in institutional frames associated with the act of immigration (H4). And, once these factors are taking into account, we predict that the association between immigrant status and legitimacy will be attenuated (H5). We suggest, that is, that one reason why immigrants have different views of the police is that, compared with non-immigrants, they are located differently within the social order and have views of policing that are conditioned, in part, by comparisons with police and other institutions in their countries of origin.
Data and measures

Data
We draw on data from the ESS -a social survey designed to chart and explain the interaction between Europe's changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour patterns of its diverse populations (www.europeansocialsurvey.org). The survey is widely seen to be the highest quality cross-European survey. Although not all countries achieve it, the aspiration is that all should have probability samples of the adult (15 plus) population, with high response rates, interviewed face-to-face using CAPI (computer assisted personal interviewing). We draw primarily on the 'trust in justice' module included in Round 5 of the ESS, as well as items from elsewhere in the dataset made available to researchers. Fieldwork for Round 5 of the ESS was done in 2010/11; 28 countries took part; and a dataset of 27 countries became available in early 2012.
1 It should be noted that, while patterns of immigration and policing may of course have developed since 2010/2011, this is a rare opportunity to estimate important patterns of relationships in 27 countries -and the rotating module on trust in justice has not yet 'rotated' (i.e. it has been fielded only once so far).
We should also note the level of analysis. Our analysis focuses on broad, aggregate patterns at the general population level of 27 countries. It is, therefore, about establishing some high-level phenomenon, for future studies to build upon and flesh out. Perhaps an example helps. In the UK we have seen general population surveys capturing patterns of police-citizen contact and the dynamics of procedural justice and legitimacy (Bradford et al. 2009; Jackson et al. 2012) . This work has set the context for more focused analysis on the neighbourhood context of police-contact and legitimacy across London (Jackson et al. 2013 ) and the zooming in on certain special populations (e.g. young males from various ethnicities in certain deprived London localities, see Jackson et al. 2013 , and a small number of contrasting neighbourhoods, Bradford & Jackson, 2016) .
Measuring police legitimacy
We take a dual component approach to measuring police legitimacy, such that we have two outcome variables for analysis (Jackson et al., 2012; Hough et al., 2013; Jackson 2015) . On this account, the police can be said to be empirically legitimate when citizens believe (a) officers wield their power in normatively appropriate ways (reflecting the sense that their power is normatively justified) and (b) that they as, citizens of a given political community, have a positive moral duty to obey police instructions (reflecting the sense that the institution has rightful authority and is therefore entitled to be obeyed).
Three survey items tapped, first, into respondent's sense of normative alignment with police-the extent to which they believed that police act according to societal expectations regarding appropriate conduct. Asking people to agree or disagree with statements such as 'I generally support suspect how the police usually act' tries to capture a series of linked propositions: first, that there are societal values regarding how legal authorities should wield their authority; second, that citizens' judgements about the moral right to power of legal authorities revolve largely around the extent to which institutional actors are seen to act in ways that shows respect for these societal values; and third, that when people believe that legal authorities act appropriately, this reflects both the belief that the institution has the right to power and consequently that they, as citizens, should act in normatively appropriate ways (Jackson, 2015) .
Three further items tapped into respondents' sense that they had a moral duty to obey the instructions of police officers (e.g. 'To what extent is it your moral duty to back the decisions made by police even when you disagree with them?'). This component of legitimacy therefore relates to classic conceptions concerned with the ability of authorities to command willing obedience.
Police legitimacy can be defined in terms of reflective measurement, where it is assumed to be an unobservable psychological construct that can be measured by indirect indices, and that variation in such behavioural/attitudinal indicators can be attributed to variation in the underlying psychological construct. But such scales can also be approached in a formative way -by taking, that is, a more pragmatic approach in which answers to the various questions can be combined in some manner to constitute (to form not reflect) the construct of interest. Multiple deprivation and socio-economic status are classic examples of concepts that are lend themselves well to formative measurement. The UK's index of multiple deprivation captures levels of neighbourhood deprivation along seven different dimensions, with a weighted mean produced to form the overall index. The idea is here deprivation is not one unobservable latent property of a neighbourhood, causing joint variation in each of its seven dimensions.
Instead, each of the seven dimensions can be sensibly measured using various official statistics, and it is useful to aggregate them together for various policy reasons.
Another example of formative measurement is fear of crime. For instance, one could pragmatically form a number of different categories of fear (differentiating between functional fear and dysfunctional fear, for instance, see Jackson & Gray, 2010) to simplify analysis on a number of different levels. In this paper we take a formative approach -for each respondent we take the mean of the three indicators for each of normative alignment and duty to obeybecause it represents a pragmatic and straightforward way to address issues of (cross-national) measurement equivalence. We assume, that is, that police legitimacy within a particular country (and across the 27 countries included in the analysis) can be assessed by taking the mean of the three indicators available for each component, and that the resulting indicator has the same substantive meaning across the individuals and countries included in the dataset. (Rumbaut 1994) , and those who migrated as adults, and thus to take some account of the fact that immigration is not a 'state' but a 'process' through which people move.
Experience of policing. ESS respondents were asked, first, if police in their country had approached, stopped or made contact with them for any reason in the last two years; second, they were asked how satisfied they were with the conduct of the police on the last occasion this occurred (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). Police contact was entered into the models as three dummy variables, representing satisfactory contact, neutral contact, and unsatisfactory contact (the reference category was 'no contact').
Group position. Five measures of group position were included our models (see, again, Table 1 ). All concern the extent of political and socio-economic incorporation; the first three, however, relate more clearly to horizontal incorporation: the extent to which people feel they 'belong'. First, a binary indicator represented whether an individual was a citizen of the country in which they lived. Second, to measure experience of ethnic discrimination answers to a range of questions were combined into a binary indicator, which was coded 1 if a respondent indicated they were members of a group discriminated against on the grounds of colour or race, nationality, religion, language, or ethnic group. Third, voting behaviour was also captured by two dummy variables. The first was coded 1 if a respondent did not vote in the last national election because they were not eligible to vote, while the second was coded 1 if the respondent did not vote in the last election but was eligible to vote (the reference category was therefore 'voted in the last national election'). Disengagement from political activity is a well-recognized indicator of social exclusion (Burchardt et al. 1999| ).
The remaining measures of group position relate primarily to vertical incorporation and, specifically, to economic security. Unemployment captures the objective experience of being outside paid employment. Coping on income, by contrast, captures the subjective experience of economic insecurity as well as its mere existence. ESS respondents were asked "Which of these descriptions … comes closest to how you feel about your households income nowadays?", with the possible responses set as: 'living comfortably on present income'; 'coping on present income'; finding it difficult on present income'; and ' finding it very difficult on present income'. Responses to this item were entered into our models as a set of three dummy variables, with the reference category set as 'living comfortably'.
Institutional frames. Three measures were used to tap into how change in institutional context might shape immigrants assessments of police legitimacy. The first concerned corruption and the rule of law, and here we draw on, and extend, the measure used by Röder and Mühlau (2012) . If, as they argue, "immigrants compare the institutional reality of the host country with their experiences of institutions in the home country as a reference point" (ibid: 376), it seems likely that the 'institutional reality' of law and corruption is a particularly salient factor in relation to the police. surveys of individuals and businesses and reports from NGOs, into an overall country-level index, the control of corruption index is intended to capture "perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests" (World Bank 2015a). The similarly derived rule of law index is intended to capture "perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence" (World Bank 2015b). These two indicators were selected from the set of six WGI indicators as those most likely to frame perceptions of the police.
For inclusion in our models the raw scales were transformed thus. First, the average of across the period 1996-2009 was calculated for each country. 5 The resulting country-level measures of corruption and rule of law were extremely highly correlated (.97), so the mean was taken to create a country level measure of law and corruption. Each respondent in the dataset was then assigned two values for this measure, one for their country of birth and one for their country of residence. A measure of change in law and corruption was then created by subtracting the value for country of birth from that of country of residence (mean .11; SD .46; min -2.81; max 4.22). Non-immigrants by definition scored zero on this measure; a positive score indicates that an individual moved from a more corrupt country were the rule of law was less well established to a less corrupt country where the rule of law was better established.
Among immigrants the mean value was 1.18, indicating that immigrant respondents tended to have moved from more to less corrupt countries. Note that this is an individual level indicator, a point we return to in the discussion.
The second measure of immigrants' frame of reference was calculated in a similar way.
To assess how change in the level of crime might affect views of the police subsequent to migrating, homicide (murders per 100,000 population) data for the period 1995-2009 was obtained from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime International Homicide Statistics database. The average murder rate for each country was again calculated, and after mean-centering the 5 Where data coverage was partial the mean was calculated using the available years. 6 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/ resulting scores a measure of change in the murder rate was calculated for each respondent (mean -.29; SD 2.4; min -53.24; max 9.61). A negative score on this measure indicates that a respondent moved from a country with a higher murder rate to one with a lower murder ratethe mean for immigrants was -3.4, indicating that on average immigrants moved from more to less violent countries.
Finally, a measure of change in GDP per capita (in current US dollars) was also calculated, again using data from the World Bank. The years 1996 to 2009 were selected to match the timeframes used for the other variables, and the mean for each country was taken. A change variable was then created as before (mean 1, 433, SD 6, 447; 123; max 55, 215) .
A positive score on the change in GDP measures indicates that a respondent moved from a poorer to a richer country. For immigrants the mean of this measure was 15,883 -immigrants moved on average from poorer to richer countries.
Clearly, many immigrant respondents in the ESS migrated before 1996, and there must be some doubt about the validity of the measures described above for those who had spent a long time in the destination country by the time of interview. However relative levels of corruption (Kaufman et al. 2010 ) and homicide (Lafree and Tseloni 2006) are generally stable over time, suggesting that variables estimating change between origin and destination countries may have greater validity for longer-term immigrants than would otherwise have been the case.
Control variables
An important control variable was ethnic minority status, which was based on a question that simply asked respondents "Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in (this country)?" (1=yes; 0=no). Models also controlled for gender, age (entered as two dummy variables to avoid collinearity with the 'length of stay' measure), religion, level of education (years in full-time education) and crime victimization.
Analytic strategy
We start with a descriptive analysis of the experiences of policing and 'group positions' of immigrants compared with non-immigrants. In the main modelling we use a two-level multi-level model to account for the clustering of individuals within countries, and the fact that perceptions of legitimacy varied between countries. A random effects model allows us to partition between-individual and between-country variance, meaning that we can assess the extent to which individual-level predictors explain variation in individual-level perceived legitimacy, while also adjusting for respondent country of residence. Table 1 shows that across the 27 countries included in the analysis immigrants were somewhat less likely to have experienced police-initiated contact in the past two years. Yet 2 nd generation immigrants, and those who had arrived as children, were more likely to have experienced unsatisfactory police contact (indicating that when these groups did have contact with police they were more likely to judge it unsatisfactory).
Results
Descriptive analysis
Immigrants were also clearly more likely to have a less favourable 'group position' than non-immigrants, being: less likely to be citizens; more likely to choose not to vote; more likely to be unemployed, and more likely to be finding it hard to get by.
Regression analysis
Results from a series of random effects models predicting normative alignment with police are shown in Table 2 . At the bivariate level there was an association between immigrant status and this component of legitimacy (Model 1). Compared with the native-born population, immigrants who had arrived as children, and people whose parents were immigrants, tended to feel less normatively aligned with police; yet immigrants who had arrived between 5 and 15 years ago tended to feel more normatively aligned. Model 2 in Table adds adds all together. Almost all were statistically significant predictors of police legitimacy (which is hardly surprising given the sample size involved). Across the European population as a whole, those with less favourable group positions -who experienced discrimination, who chose not to vote at the last election, who were unemployed and struggled to manage on their incomes -tended to grant the police in their country less legitimacy. A notable exception was citizenship -all else equal non-citizens, perhaps unexpectedly, tended to grant police more legitimacy than citizens. As expected, recent contact with officers was also strongly associated with legitimacy, with unsatisfactory contact having a larger statistical effect than satisfactory contact.
Perhaps most striking, though, are the measures of institutional frames. When added alone (Model 5) none were significant predictors of normative alignment. Yet, conditional on contact with police and group position in Model 6, we find that people who moved from more to less corrupt countries, and from poorer to richer countries, tended to feel more normatively aligned with the police in their destination country. By contrast, there was a small but significant positive statistical effect associated with moving from a country with a lower murder rate to one with a higher rate -those who moved from a less to a more violent country seemed to be more inclined to support police in their new home. 7 All else being equal, it may be that the experience of a new, more violent context prompts somewhat more positive views of police as potential protection from that violence.
Finally, once all the explanatory variables were present in Model 6, any positive association between immigrant status and normative alignment was broken. It seems this was entirely explained by the other variables in the model. However the negative associations remain, and controlling for all the variables in Model 6 second generation immigrants, those who arrived as children, and those who arrived as adults over 15 years ago granted the police less legitimacy than their native born counterparts. Table 3 shows the results from models that repeat the above process for the duty to obey component of legitimacy. Model 1 shows that, again, there was a significant association between being an immigrant and the perceived duty to obey police. Those who had arrived less than 15 years ago tended to feel a stronger duty to obey police; here, however, those who arrived as children, and second generation immigrants, did not on average feel differently to their native-born counterparts. Model 2 adds control variables, which again have little effect on the measures of immigrant status (although note that the negative coefficient for 'arrived 15-20 years ago achieves significance in this model).
Model 3-6 in Table 3 adds the three groups of explanatory variables. The findings in relation to police contact and group position are very similar to before, the one exception being that the experience of discrimination had no unique association with perceived duty to obey.
However of the institutional frame measures only change in GDP was significant -people who had moved from poorer to rich countries tended to feel a greater duty to obey police in the destination country. Also as above, any positive association between immigrant status and duty to obey was broken by the introduction of the other explanatory variables. Indeed, once the other variables in Model 6 were taken into account a more negative association between immigrant status and this component of legitimacy emerged, particularly in relation to those immigrants who had arrived as children.
Discussion
Five hypotheses guided the analysis above. H1 found some support, in that some groups of immigrants, those who had arrived as adults less than 15 years ago, did indeed grant the police be an important factor shaping their relations with police. Third, and cutting across everything else, we have not been able to take account of the reasons for migration. The ESS data do not record why immigrants moved from one country to another -e.g. as a student, worker, family member or refugee -and variation in migration experiences seems likely to have an important effect on relations with police in the destination country. Further work -which drills down into local contexts and experiences -will be needed to see if these and related factors are associated with legitimacy judgments.
Conclusions
The analysis presented in this paper demonstrates the diverse range of factors that shape the legitimacy of the police among the policed. Contact with the police and group position, as well as demographic factors, were correlated with legitimacy, as was change in institutional frames associated with migration. The idea that the police are not only a key component of the state but also represent and indeed embody it is therefore supported by the ESS data. Legitimacy is shaped not only by people's direct contacts with officers but also by the extent to which the wider state -or, perhaps, society -is successful in integrating its members and securing social and economic goods for them. Concerns about the institutional effect of what immigrants 'bring with them' seem, on this basis, to be misplaced -the primary factors shaping their views of the police are their experiences in their new home.
While the primary emphasis of this paper has been theoretical there are therefore some important policy lessons here. On the one hand, efforts to enhance police legitimacy, which concern policy-makers in many jurisdictions, seem unlikely to succeed if they are applied in a way that ignores contextual factors. Due to the symbolic meanings attached to police, and the affective links people draw between police and wider social and political categories, it is arguable that police legitimacy cannot be 'improved' without also attending to deeper structural inequalities that shape people's relations with the state and their fellow citizens (and/or denizens -Hammar 1990) . At the very least, since the structure of public feelings toward police is highly + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 Table 3 Random effects linear regression models predicting perceived duty to obey police 
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